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Why does a firm exist? Machlup (1967) elaborated on the age old argument of which 
theory of the firm was correct, and highlighted that each theory targets a very specific subset 
of what the firm is. He concluded that “the choice of the theory has to depend on the problem 
we have to solve” (p. 30-31). This view is still true today, with one of the key shortcomings we 
see in the literature being that while many theories of the firm explain some aspects of the 
creation of the firm, none truly explains the problem of why the firm exists in the first place. 
Marshall’s Principle of Economics (1961) defined the firm as a profit maximizer, which built 
the roots for the neoclassical view of the firm. Coase’s seminal article The Nature of the Firm 
(1937) proposed transaction costs as the key determinants of the theory of the firm, which 
Williamson (1979) elaborated on further. Since Coase, several aspects of the theory of the 
firm were developed, including the strategic theory of the firm (RUMELT; LAMB, 1997), the 
behavioral theory of the firm (CYERT; MARCH, 1963), and knowledge based theory of the 
firm (GRANT, 1996), among others. 
Bylund, in his book The Problem of Production (2015), proposes a new theory of the firm 
with an even more profound definition than what existing theories of the firm have previously 
suggested. The firm, according to Bylund, is an “island of specialization” (p. 84), emerging 
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outside the current extent of the market as an outcome of entrepreneurial undertaking and as 
a solution to “specialization deadlock” (p. 65) within the market by innovating, and in turn 
expanding the extent of the market. “Specialization deadlock” occurs when “the divisions of 
labor and capital engender a path-dependent development that is limited to gradual changes 
and adaptive responses to exogenous change” (BYLUND, 2015, p. 65). While existing theories 
of the firm aim at answering ‘why’ the firm exists, ‘what’ the firm is, and ‘how’ it exists, the 
new theory of the firm presented in this book focuses on ‘what’ the economic function of the 
firm is, which leads to why it exists at all and how it emerges. 
Bylund makes several critical contribu-tions, one of which is to bring more clarity to the 
definition of the firm based on its economic function. What is, then, the economic function of 
the firm? The economic function of the firm, according to Bylund, is to solve the problem of 
production that is embodied in the concept of the specialization deadlock by being an island 
of specialization. Placing the firm as a solution to specialization deadlock explains why the 
firm exists, which is a key contribution to what we see as a shortcoming in the literature.
Bylund (2015) states the firm as an outcome of the implementation of novel and innovative 
production through means not currently available in the market (p. 97-98). A firm within the 
market may be able to marginally increase productivity or streamline processes by virtue of 
the price mechanism, but it cannot create anything truly new. As Schumpeter (2017) argues 
in The Theory of Economic Development, novel products are created by new firms that do not 
already exist in the market. To create something new requires the firm to step outside the 
existing boundary conditions imposed by the market. This argument is elaborated with an 
extensive look at the very nature of what the firm is, which is creatively defined as an ‘island 
of specialization’. In other words, the market can overcome the economic problem of limited 
specialization within the market by utilizing innovative firm emerging outside the existing 
market.
Specialization, being the driver of productivity increases in Bylund’s model, is showcased 
as the critical component for the existence of the firm. Bylund highlights Adam Smith’s (1776) 
pin factory as an example in which specialization of tasks allows for the increased production 
of pins over nonspecialized pin producers. As the pin is subdivided, products in the market 
become further subdivided to increase productivity. This subdivision falls prey to the concept 
of the incomplete good. The value of an unfinished good is nonexistent to the end user, and 
the unfinished good only has value to those that create subsequent goods from it. The new 
level of specialization presents an issue since the novelty produced from an unfinished good 
may or may not be viable in the market. In order for a firm to enter the market, the value of 
this new specialization has to be higher than the existing methods of producing the novel 
good. Should the cost of the new specialization be too high or should the novel good not fit 
within the existing market, the firm will be unable to sell that good and subsequently fail to 
enter the market. In short, the problem the market faces is one where a firm with a new idea 
or specialization cannot come into existence within the constraints of the market as the market 
has no means of properly pricing the new idea until it has come to fruition and turned into 
a product the market can either purchase or sell.
The emergence of the firm outside the market is not without its costs. In bringing novel 
ways of production and new specializations to the market, the firm must overcome several 
Duygu Phillips & Shawn Jones
3 de 5 | MISES: Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy Law and Economics, São Paulo, 2019; 7(3) Set-Dez
difficulties such as acquiring financial capital, surviving further competition, and resisting 
absorption by the market. Even though the existing market production also requires some 
capital investment, the firm looking to bring about an innovation must also bear uncertainty. 
Moreover, the required time until the returns are achieved is longer than the market production, 
further adding to the level of uncertainty and to risk.
Bylund does a masterful job of reducing the idea of the firm to its most basic purpose, to 
be an agent of production. The firm plays a central role in the development of an economy 
by means of entrepreneurial action. This is supported by both Austrian economics and 
entrepreneurship theories. However, what is different in Bylund’s new theory of the firm is 
that the firm “ends with market-making” (BYLUND, 2015, p. 140), as the competition increases 
in the extended market. Defined as an institution with a specific economic function, the 
firm is argued to facilitate the expansion of the extent of the market, as well as the increased 
specialization in the market. While this argument makes perfect sense, it also generates a 
paradox: as the firm expands the extent of the market, it is argued to shorten its own lifecycle 
once it enters the market. One important follow up question would be to determine strategies 
that help the firm endures this threat of getting absorbed by the market as the competitors 
appear and the innovation becomes a commodity. 
The concept of the firm as described by Bylund fits quite well with the current literature 
in the field of entrepreneurship. By generating all three types of entrepreneurship within the 
market process, innovation solves the problem of production by equilibrating, disequilibrating, 
and kaleidoscopic outcomes. Entrepreneurial action with the goal of offering a novelty to the 
society to satisfy the needs and wants of the customers can equilibrate or disequilibrate the 
market. The entrepreneur accepts the risk associated with the creation and implementation of 
a new idea in order to create a firm. The Schumpeterian (2017) disequilibrating entrepreneur, 
who brings something completely new to the world, would have to step outside of the market 
to create the firm as there would be no customers for his/her novel goods and thus no market 
for the firm to exist within. Schumpeter defines the producer as an initiator of economic 
change within the economic development process including new goods, new quality of goods, 
new production methods untested by the market, new markets, or new raw materials, or 
new organizations of industry, which are the domain of the entrepreneur. (SCHUMPETER, 
2017) In line with this definition, Bylund’s framework presents the new firm as an actor that 
changes the market through new specialization, and the entrepreneur as the backbone of 
economic development. Should the new island of specialization created by the entrepreneur 
be successful, the market would expand to encompass the new firm. Should it fail, it would 
not have much of an effect at all and the market would remain unchanged. As with Bylund’s 
view of the firm, a firm that is unsuccessful will simply not join the market. 
The Kirznerian (1973) equilibrating entrepreneur, one who discovers new opportunities 
within a market is also supported by this view of the firm. Kirzner argues that the existence of 
economic error leads to the divergence of prices which create opportunities for entrepreneurs 
to correct the error and bridge the gap in the market. “At each instant, because the market 
is in a state of disequilibrium, genuine allocative inefficiencies remain yet to be removed 
simply because entrepreneurs have not yet noticed the profit opportunities represented by 
these inefficiencies” (KIRZNER, 1978, p. 74). In this case, the sub specialization of an existing 
Diagramação e XML SciELO Publishing Schema: www.editoraletra1.com.br | letra1@editoraletra1.com.br
THE FIRM BEYOND THE MARKET
4 de 5 | MISES: Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy Law and Economics, São Paulo, 2019; 7(3) Set-Dez
good, which is an allocative inefficiency in this case, in the market would also force the firm 
to emerge outside the market, as while there are preceding goods and a market for the final 
good, the new system used by the firm which creates that good is untested. The new process 
used by the Kirznerian entrepreneur in this case may or may not create the desired result and 
thus still falls prey to the whims of the market. If the new process is better than the existing 
methods, it will enlarge the market and the firm will then join the market. If the process fails, 
the firm will fail to join the market, and thus the market will remain unchanged.
The firm is the natural outcome of entrepreneurial action, rather than the means of the 
market. It is an outcome of the implementation of novel and innovative production that cannot 
be realized through means currently available in the market. This view of the firm is in 
stark contrast to the initial traditional views of the firm based on Coase, who “assets that the 
firm is a formal organization that is based on the concept of authority, which supersedes the 
market’s price mechanism and therefore is distinct from market coordination.” (BYLUND, 2015, 
p. 97). While Coase’s firm exists outside the market as well, Bylund’s firm neither requires it 
to be a formal organization based on the concept of authority, nor does it supersede the price 
mechanism of the market. On the contrary, Bylund’s firm is dependent on the market’s price 
mechanism for its very existence. While according to Bylund’s theory, the price mechanism 
of the market does not work within the firm, the firm as a whole is still quite reliant on the 
market for the final product, even where the firm’s final product is merely a subcomponent 
of a larger product.
Overall, The Problem of Production offers a well-developed theory of the firm and an 
advancing perspective on the nature of the market as a whole. By identifying the firm as the 
end result of specialization, Bylund creates a solid new theory of the firm which focuses on 
the economic function of the firm, by answering the question of why the firm exists at all. By 
focusing on the economic function of the firm and how the firm fits within a larger market, 
Bylund bridges the gaps between a pre firm market, firm creation, and the firm entering the 
market. After all, without a market the firm has no reason to exist. Through the in-depth 
elaboration of the function of the market, beginning with the creation of money itself (MENGER, 
1892; MISES, 1949), Bylund creates a step by step view of the way firms are created in the real 
world. The new theory of the firm explains how firms affect the market as well as how they are 
affected by the market. As Bylund’s firm ends with market making, there exists a gap within 
the book where companies already in the market can survive and create new products. One 
possible solution would be to examine how a company can straddle the line of being outside 
the market while also being within the market. Future research can look into how firms 
can resist the market absorption while introducing innovation and expanding the market. 
Therefore, the next question could be how can innovation strengthen firms within the extent 
of the market? Put differently, how can innovative firms resist specialization deadlock within 
the market? After all, there are innovative companies, such as Apple, creating disruption (the 
Iphone for example) while within the market. One additional question which can be posed is: 
Can the firm emerge outside the extent of the market and survive within the market without 
innovation? In other words, is it possible for a firm to survive long-term within the extent of 
the market while being beset by innovative firms from outside the market? We believe this 
could be an opportunity as well as a challenge for the future theory of the firm. 
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